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1. Introduction 
By the time of its founding in 1949, PRC was one of the poorest countries in the world.  The 
revolutionary Chinese government and people carried out a fundamental socio-economic 
transformation and embarked on a path of moderately dynamic economic growth. This first, initial 
stage of PRC’s socioeconomic development lasted about three decades, spanning the 1950s, 1960s 
and 1970s.  Since the late 1970s, China has launched a series of progressively deeper market-
oriented reforms, without relinquishing the dominant role of the State and of the Communist Party 
in key areas of the economy.  The cumulative result of these major, albeit gradual, changes has been 
the transition of China’s formerly centrally-planned socialist fabric to a new and unique 
socioeconomic system.  This new system has proven so far to be endowed with a relatively high 
degree of stability, consistency and sustainability, in spite of the extraordinary speed of its incessant 
internal evolution.  In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to the post-1978 and pre-1978 
periods of PRC’s economic history as the reform and pre-reform period, respectively.  
 
By the end of  WWII, China’s per capita GDP was only slightly over 20% of the world average and 
5% of that of the US.  On balance, China’s overall growth performance was no better than that of 
India and of most other backward countries.  It looks particularly gloomy when compared to the 
then-unprecedented success of two of its capitalist neighbors and rivals, Japan and South Korea.  
Both of them, starting from different levels of economic development and enjoying – quite 
differently, to be sure, from internationally isolated PRC – preferential access to the US market, 
investment and technology flows had managed to substantially reduce the development gap 
separating them from the leading economic superpowers.  
 
Conversely, since the inception of the market-socialist reforms in the late 1970s, China’s growth 
skyrocketed.  Per capita GDP increased eightfold over the period, from about 1000 to 8000 USD 
(1990).  By some standards, it can be argued that China’s catching up process, since the inception of 
the reform period, has outpaced those of Japan and South Korea in the preceding one, setting a new 
world record.  During the first half of the 2010s, China’s economic growth progressively slowed 
down, recording a rate of about  7% per year– still an extremely high figure by world standards. 
This is still more remarkable when we take into account, inter alia, the marked slowdown in 
international trade caused by the persistence of what has been dubbed “Secular Stagnation” (see 
Summers, 2014) in major leading economies. 
It is well known that the impressive reduction of poverty in the last few decades was accompanied 
by a clear increase in economic disparities. The very significant gains in inequality reduction 
achieved in post-revolutionary China during its first phase of development (the Gini coefficient 
declined from 0.558 in 1953 to 0.317 in 1978, UNDP, 2016) were subsequently erased to a large 
extent.  Indeed, while the impressive GDP growth almost completely eliminated absolute poverty, 
the change in the shape of distribution was equally strong, generating a new class composed by very 
rich people, an event that, to some extent, falls into contradiction with the concept of a socialist-
oriented country.  
While the topic of general “inequality” in China has been often examined (see, among others, Li Shi 
et al., 2008; Wang and Woo, 2011; Xie and Zhou, 2014; Wan and Wang, 2015; Cai and Liu, 2014; 
Zhuang and Li, 2016; Zhou and Song, 2016), relatively little attention has been paid to the 
polarization phenomenon.  Polarization, as opposed to inequality, has the advantage of showing 
distinct additional distributional features such as those related to the formation, consolidation or 
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“hollowing out” of the middle class (see, among others, Esteban and Ray, 1994, 1999, 2011; Duclos 
et al., 2004; Esteban et al., 2007).  Especially in a period of “secular stagnation,” the role of the 
Chinese middle class is indeed crucial, not only for the local economy but for the world as a whole 
because it is now one of the main components of the global effective demand.  
In this paper we focus on polarization by using the methodology of using an analytical approach to 
Relative Distribution Tools.In order to focus on the polarization features in the last 2 decades, an 
overview of the principal contributions on the conceptualization of middle class and polarization (in 
general and for PRC) is presented in Section 2.  Section 3 describes the data sets.  Section 4 
presents the statistical tools  and discusses the results. Section 5 presents conclusions including 
possible political economic implications of our statistical results. 
 
2. Middle class and Polarization 
 
2.1 A conceptual overview 
Since the turn of this century, polarization has come to the forefront of international socioeconomic 
research, due to its paramount role in the analysis of the evolution of income, consumption 
expenditures and wealth
1
 distribution. Polarization methodology---particularly in our relative 
distribution version--- can be used to examine the potential for social conflicts, economic growth 
and development as well.
2
  The logic of this method is that polarization is one fruitful attempt 
among  others
3
 at measuring the objective segregation among social groups with respect to their 
respective material well-being, which is in turn identified with the degree of within-group similarity 
and between-group disparity.  The concept of polarization is thus intrinsically related to that of 
socio-economic classes and class-consciousness – although not exclusively with the Marxian or 
Weberian concepts (other ones are that of middle class and of marginal/excluded class).  
Polarization describes the degree to which a population is segregated into groups in a society 
(Gradín, 2000: 457).  It detects the presence or disappearance of such groups in a distribution 
(Chakravarty, 2009), indicates how individuals and groups feel toward one another (Duclos, 
Esteban and Ray, 2004), and captures the phenomena of a diminishing middle class or a divided 
society (Zhang and Kanbur, 2001).  
According to Esteban and Ray (1994: 824), the concept of polarization has three features: a small 
number of groups, a high degree of homogeneity within each group (the so-called identification 
ingredient), and significant heterogeneity between groups (the so-called alienation ingredient).  It is 
a powerful indicator, of the objective social conditions that can be expected to bring about 
subjective (psychological, sociological and ultimately political) within-group identification and 
between-group alienation on the part of individuals belonging to different social groups - more so 
than measures of income or wealth inequality and poverty. Thus, it can be seen as a warning red 
                                                          
1
 In the remainder of this paper we will use simply the term “income distribution,” implicitly referring both to monetary 
(income and expenditures) and not-monetary distribution studies. 
2
 See among others Esteban and Ray, 2008, Esteban and Schneider, 2008 (and more generally, the Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 45, No. 2, Special Issue on Polarization and Conflict, March 2008); recently, Gochoco-Bautista et al., 
2013; Corral et al., 2015. 
3
 There are attempts, for example, by scholars like Erik Olin Wright to objectively quantify empirical class divisions.  
Social Accounting Matrices of various designs try to do the same or something more eclectic, similar to polarization 
literature in terms of classification of households and mapping from factors to households.  See Taylor, 1990; Khan 
1985, 1997a,b, 1998, 199a,b, 2004a,b, 2007, 2010, 2017; James and Khan, 1993, 1997, 1998; Khan and Thorbecke, 
1988, 1989. 
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flag urging corrective interventions, and ultimately (unless such policy actions are promptly and 
effectively carried out) as a predictor of future social conflict.  
The concept of polarization is intuitively associated with the structural features of middle class: as a 
first approximation, polarization implies a hollowing out of the middle class and a fattening of one 
or both tails of the distributional curve.  Actually, the terms middle class and polarization are, by 
themselves, etymologically quite clear and intuitive.  Limiting our focus on “objective” income 
distribution analysis,
4
 it is apparent that (barring the extreme case of perfect equality) in every 
(national) society
5
 some people are rich, some are poor, and some are not-so-rich and not-so-poor.  
Utilizing heuristically and neutrally the term “class” to refer to each of these groupings, the last one 
can naturally be termed “middle class” – i.e.,  the middle class is simply that part of the population 
that, in terms of income (or consumption expenditures), is in the middle between the “rich” and the 
“poor.”6  
From the viewpoint of the history of socioeconomic thought, the modern concept of class came to 
the fore along with the analysis of the capitalist system.  The main schools of thought that accorded 
a paramount role to class are the Marxian and the Weberian ones.  For Marx, class is a central 
abstract category aimed to understanding the internal laws of the motions of capitalism.  The two 
core classes are bourgeoisie and proletariat, identified according to their opposite position vis-a-vis 
the ownership of capital.  Yet, a third, less clearly defined intermediate class (the middle class) also 
exists, mainly composed by professionals and petty traders.  Classes are “real social processes 
reflected in thought which help to reveal the essential class dynamics of the capitalist mode of 
production” (Lekhi, 2001, p.161).  It is therefore at this relatively high level of theoretical 
abstraction that Marx and Engels put forward their well-known belief in the tendency towards the 
polarization of capitalist society in two opposite classes in the Manifesto: “Society as a whole is 
more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each 
other: bourgeoisie and proletariat (Marx and Engels, 1848))” and, more precisely in Das Kapital, 
discussing the general law of the accumulation of capital (Book I, Ch.23).  Weber analyzes class in 
a more general context of social stratification, where class is one dimension of social structure along 
with another, social status.  He also attaches great relevance to the concepts of power, domination, 
and communal and societal action (see also Coser, 1977; Lekhi, 2001; Shortel, 2016).  In spite of 
their differences, Marx’ and Weber’s concepts of class are to some extent similar in two important 
                                                          
4
 Many sociological and psychological studies have explored the relevance and diffusion of the “middle class values” 
and the varying subjective degrees of identification with the middle class on the part of different social groups that 
might be very distant from the latters’ objective belonging to a given income or wealth.  For instance, it is well-known 
that most Americans tend to identify themselves as middle class, more so than their European counterparts.  This 
difference is partly related to moral and ethical values attached to the term in different cultural contexts, and to the 
intrinsically different meaning that the terms “middle class” and “working class” have evolved into in different 
countries (see also Sosnaud et al., 2013; Hout, 2008; Jackman and Jackman, 1983). 
5
 Other studies adopt an international, or even a worldwide approach, utilizing concepts such as between-country 
inequality and, in some cases, global polarization and global middle class.  The global middle class is usually identified 
with the worldwide aggregation of uneven population groups belonging to the population of many developed and 
developing countries, all of them unified by the characteristic of being endowed with a sufficient high purchasing power 
to be able to buy a certain bundle of modern tradable goods and services.  The global middle class is composed by 
households with an income equal to or higher than a minimum threshold (set in international dollars).  Given the focus 
of the analysis, many studies do not even establish any upper bound to the global middle class, thereby implicitly 
identifying the middle with the upper global class and thus classifying substantially the world population in only two 
classes: those who can accede to a minimum bundle of modern tradable consumerist items and those who can’t.  See 
AfDB, 2011; OECD, 2011; Corral et al., 2015.  
6
 Perceptive and rigorous scholars like Murakami (1997) have used the term “middle masses” which avoids the Marxist 
criticism that the middle class is a theoretically loose and underspecified term. 
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respects: they see the economic dimension of class as key, and define a particular class location 
according to its links with other classes.
7
 
In the domain of statistics the concept of class is straightforward and uncontroversial although not 
identical with the above conceptualization.  A class is a grouping of values by which data is binned 
for computation of a frequency distribution (Kenney and Keeping 1962, p. 14).  Thus, in the case of 
income distributions, an income class is composed by households in which income falls between 
the limits of a range of values (called a class interval).  Here the terms class and grouping are 
interchangeable and unconnected with any substantive social, political or economic theory.  
Therefore, when the term middle class is used neutrally (i.e., independently from any conceptual 
elaboration of its socioeconomic function) the middle class is simply identified with “middle-
income households” – i.e., households with an income that falls in an arbitrarily determined interval 
centered around the median (see Alichi et al., 2016).
8
 Of course, this use of the term class in the 
context of income/ wealth distribution does not imply (or deny) that middle-income households – 
or, by the same token, low or rich-income households – form a class in the above-mentioned, strong 
sociological sense.  We might call this meaning of class, which is in fact purely quantitative, neutral 
and unambiguous, a “weak” meaning.  In the domain of applied research – as opposed to that of 
purely theoretical thinking – it is only after reaching robust quantitative results that analysts can (if 
they deem it meaningful) put forward an interpretation pivoting on the “strong,” socioeconomic 
concept of class.  
Middle class (the boundaries of which are set according to subjective
9
 criteria by researchers 
themselves) and polarization are mostly analyzed both in a cross-country and a historical 
perspective.  They aim to find out whether the middle class has been evolving over time to 
constitute a larger or smaller share of the population, and/or capturing a larger or smaller share of 
total national income.
10
 In this context, polarization can be understood as a tendency on the part of 
the population and/or of national income to concentrate itself around two opposite “poles” (the 
rich and the poor). 
Thus, both terms naturally point towards an analytic and descriptive distributional vision of society 
that is rather clear-cut, essentially constituted by just three major groupings.  If the third, 
intermediate group tends to wither out while the population concentrates itself towards the upper or 
the lower tail, a polarization process is going on.  This “pure” form of polarization can be estimated 
with two relatively straightforward and unambiguous methodologies.  One consists in choosing 
arbitrarily a statistical interval setting the boundaries of the middle class (for instance, defining it as 
consisting of households with 50-150 percent of median income), and using it to estimate the 
                                                          
7
 After Marx and Weber, the idea of class has remained a central one in the domains of sociology and (to a lesser 
extent) of economic science, and has been subsequently discussed by many analysts, scholars, and politicians.  This 
debate has focused mainly on conceptual and theoretical issues, such as the identification of social classes, their 
functional mutual interactions, and the relationship between objective belonging to one or another class grouping and its 
subjective perception. 
8
 Alichi et al., define “middle-income households” as those with an income falling in an interval ranging from 50 to 150 
percent of median income, and show that their weight in  total US population fell from 58% in 1970 to  47 % in 2014 
(Fig 3, p. 5). 
9
 Subjective is not synonymous of haphazard.  Researchers can legitimately adopt various and possibly diverging 
criteria in setting the boundaries of the middle class, according to their different ex-ante theoretical views and analytical 
goals. 
10
 The two phenomena might evolve in opposite directions. For instance, in a period of sustained growth characterized 
by poverty reduction, on one hand, and a shift of income distribution favoring the very rich, on the other hand, the 
relative weight of middle class households might increase while the share of total income they capture diminishes.   
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relative share on  middle class households in the total population.  The other is based on the 
Wolfson index (W), which estimates the relative size of the middle class measuring the degree of 
clustering around the median (see also Foster and Wolfson , 1992 and Wolfson, 1994, Alichi et al., 
2016). 
Since the turn of the century, both the concepts and measurements of the middle class and 
polarization have been the object of novel theoretical and statistical elaborations.  In different 
analytical contexts these theoretical efforts have ended up referring to concepts that are quite 
different from the original ones. The most important one is that of multi-polar polarization.  The 
modern concept of polarization was pioneered by Esteban and Ray, 1994.  This approach is 
reasonable, as it allows to extend the concept of polarization to cover a much wider set of possible 
states of the world.  If the number of groups is greater than three, the result is multi-polar 
polarization.  In the recent literature on the statistical measurement of polarization, multi-polar 
polarization refers to the “clustering around local means of the distribution, wherever these local 
means are located on the income scale” (Chakravarty, 2015, p. vii).  
 
 
2.2 Middle class and Polarization in PRC 
Since the inception of the industrial revolution, notwithstanding the numerous historical examples 
of successful catching up processes in many backward countries, a long-term trend towards ever-
increasing polarization has prevailed worldwide.  However, since the last decades of the XXth 
century this trend appears to have been reversed, thanks mostly to the exceptional growth 
performance of the PRC (and, to a lesser extent, of India).  Yet, inside PRC itself, it has been 
accompanied by a  trend towards increasing within-country inequality .  More recently, following 
the increasing attention by the international research community,  crucial social and political 
implications are being grasped. As a result, analysts have begun to carry out studies that focus 
specifically on polarization.  These contributions aim, first of all, to determine whether or not 
mounting inequality  implies also a trend towards increasing polarization, and (if this is in fact the 
case) to analyze in depth what kind of polarization – mainly, bi-polar or multi-polar – is taking 
place, particularly in China. 
The earliest studies showed a marked degree of geography-related polarization between urban and 
rural areas and between coastal and inland provinces (see Kanbur and Zhang, 2001).  Polarization 
also appeared to be on the rise, albeit moderately, although countervailing trends also emerged.  
During the early reform period, the rural-urban gap diminished, thanks to the success of initial 
agricultural reforms and the boom of TVEs. Yet, the latter also caused increasing polarization 
between more and less advanced rural communities. More recently, in the 1990s, polarization 
appeared to be stable, but afterwards an unambiguous rising trend became apparent.  Urban 
polarization, in particular, has been driven by the liberalization of the labor market that has led to a 
widening of wage dispersion and – to some extent – unemployment, by the decrease in subsidies 
and by the emergence of new sources of income, such as self-employment, profits, and financial 
rents (see Bonnefond and Clément, 2012; Wan and Yang 2014). 
Bonnefond and Clément (2012) analyze polarization in China in the 1989-2006 period.  They show 
that polarization began to increase markedly since 1997, “indicating the constitution of identified 
groups in middle and upper income ranges” (p.1).  The absolute level of polarization is higher in 
urban areas, but the increase has been more steep in urban areas, suggesting a potential risk of 
social tensions.  Rural polarization is driven by the emergence of non-agricultural sources of 
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income.  Urban polarization is caused mainly by declining subsidies, the liberalization of labor 
markets and the reforms of state enterprises.  Bonnefond and Clement (2012) conclude that 
polarization in China is a by-product of the efficiency-first development strategy implemented since 
the beginning of the reform period.  They also note that the Chinese government has been 
increasingly aware of the gravity of this problem, leading to the adoption of the concept of 
“harmonious society” and to the inclusion of significant inequality and polarization reduction goals 
in the 11
th
 and 12
th
 five-year plans.  
Wan and Wang (2015) analyze polarization in China on the basis of data from the China Statistical 
Yearbooks and the China Household Income Project (CHIP), and use the decomposition technique 
in order to attribute the change in polarization into a growth and a redistribution component 
(Shorrocks, 1982).  Since the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s,
11
 nationwide polarization increased from 
a low initial base due to rising alienation, while identification was declining.  However, this trend 
was not homogenous.  In rural areas, polarization surged until the early 1990s and remained stable 
afterwards. In urban areas the peak was in 2003, followed by a slight decline until the end of the 
decade.  The authors also present a more detailed analysis carried out for the 2002-2007 period, 
identifying migrants as a distinct subgroup of the population.  In this period, overall polarization in 
China was driven mainly by the increasing alienation between rural citizens.  Migrants were 
improving their lot more than those who remained in the countryside and – in spite of the 
persistence of hukou-based discrimination in the cities – were becoming more homogeneous with 
urban citizens. The dominant polarizing income source has been investment income, especially so 
in a context where the labor share in national income was rapidly falling.  Investment income has 
been “driving polarization and segregation between investors and laborers… investors are … in the 
rich segment of a society and benefit more as financial markets develop… making the country more 
polarized” (Wan and Wang (2015) p. 13).  On the basis of their findings, Wang and Wan 
recommend to reform the hukou system in order to equalize the conditions of all urban workers, and 
to strongly promote agribusiness and further rural industrialization.   
Piketty et al (2017), in a study focusing on capital accumulation, private property and rising 
inequality
12
 in China,  also identified a long-term trend towards polarization in the 1978-2015 
period. Their results (obtained with a methodology that combines survey, fiscal and national 
account data, and which are therefore only roughly comparable to  those presented in this paper) 
show that  “the share of national income going to the top 10% of the population has increased from 
27% in 1978 to 41% by 2015, while the share going to the bottom 50% has dropped from 27% to 
15%. In other words, top 10% income earners in China used to earn 5 times more than bottom 50% 
earners, and they now earn 13.5 times more. Over the same period, the share going to the middle 
40% has been roughly stable (around 45% of total income) (Piketty et al (2017)p.31). 
 
 
3. Data description 
The NBS (National Bureau of Statistics), PRC’s official statistical agency, produces and publishes a 
vast array of information, which is presented at various levels of aggregation.  However, since the 
early 1990s, many studies on China’s income and wealth distribution have opted for using other 
                                                          
11
 The authors were not able to estimate polarization trends in some periods due to the lack of available data. 
12
 Piketty et al. (2017) show that the rising inequality trend peaked a few years ago. This finding is broadly consistent 
with most other sources, including official ones. 
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statistical sources, preferring Household Surveys collected by organizations different from the NBS, 
due mainly to two reasons.  First, independent researchers cannot access NBS microdata.  Second, 
non-NBS household surveys typically collect a larger number of potentially useful variables.  There 
are seven non-NBS household surveys relevant for distributional analysis:  
i)   CHIP – China Household Income Project; 
ii)  RUMiC – Rural-Urban Migration in Indonesia and China; 
iii)  CHNS – China Health and Nutrition Survey; 
iv) CGSS – China General Social Survey; 
v) CFPS – China Family Panel Studies; 
vi) CHARLS - China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study; 
vii) CHFS - China Household Finance Survey.  
 
These surveys differ from one another in scope and design and cover various periods and sets of 
variables.  Some of them are richer or more representative than others (for an exhaustive discussion 
of each survey’s pros and cons see Gustafson et al., 2014).  However, the main criterion of choice 
depends chiefly on researchers’ analytical goals.  As the main objective of this paper is to develop 
an estimation of PRC “well-being” distributional features, taking into account both monetary and 
non-monetary variables, we – along with several other researchers – opted for using, in a mutually 
complementary fashion, data produced by both the CHIP and CHNS  surveys, on the basis of three 
considerations.  First, CHIP data jointly cover a longer time-span (1980-2013) than other surveys.  
Second, its structural design has been consistently maintained by the NBS researchers in many 
stages of the data generating process, covering many provinces.  Third, CHIP 2002 has been 
included in the LIS Cross National Data Centre (Luxembourg) on November, 2012.  However, 
CHIP data mainly consist of monetary (income) variables, while little information is provided on 
wealth and non-monetary ones.  Conversely, the CHNS HH Survey – while less detailed with 
respect to income information proper – provides rich information on health and nutrition variables.  
Moreover, it has been carried out on the basis of a larger number of subsequent rounds (almost 10 
from 1989 to 2011; see Ward, 2014).  Yet, CHNS’s coverage of province level units is smaller than 
CHIP’s, and it does not include any of the four municipalities. 
For what concerns CHIP HH survey, we use rounds 2002 and the last available one, 2013.  CHIP 
2002 contains data relative to 9,200 rural households and 37,969 individuals from 120 counties of 
22 provinces.  Beijing represents the other large metropolitan cities (Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing).  For the East, CHIP uses data from Hebei, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong and 
Guangdong.  For the Center, CHIP uses Shanxi, Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan.  
For the West, CHIP uses Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi, Shaanxi, Xinjiang and Gansu.  The 
data from the urban survey include 6,835 households and 20,632 individuals surveyed in 70 cities 
within 11 of the 22 provinces above: e Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanxi, Anhui, 
Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu (for a deeper data description see Gustafson et al., 
2008; Li, 2008).  The CHIP 2013 is consistent with the previous 4 waves: it was supported by the 
National Natural Science Fund and National Bureau of Statistics and organized by China Institute 
for Income Distribution in Beijing Normal University.  The CHIP sample was selected on the basis 
of a systematic sampling method in three layers of east, center and west, and contains 15 provinces, 
126 cities, 234 counties, 18,948 households (7,175 urban households, 11,013 rural and 760 migrant 
households) and 64,777 individuals. 
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The China Health and Nutrition Surveys (CHNS) were conducted by the Carolina Population 
Center, University of North Carolina for a longer time span: 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 
2006, 2009 and 2011.  The data, in panel form, were collected on about 4,400 households (19,000 
individuals) in nine provinces in China: Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang (from 1997), Henan, 
Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shandong.  This selection was mainly driven by the high 
degree of diversification of these provinces from an economic, demographic and, more broadly, a 
social point of view.  The provincial capital and a lower income city were selected (when this 
choice was feasible according to the availability of data), while the villages and townships within 
counties, and urban and suburban neighborhoods within cities were selected randomly (see also Liu 
2008). 
 
4. Polarization profiles  
 
4.1 The Relative distribution method 
The Relative Distribution approach is a non-parametric one that combines the strengths of summary 
polarization indices with the details of distributional change offered by the Kernel density estimates 
(see Handcock and Morris, 1998, 1999, Alderson et al., 2005, Massari, 2009, Borraz et al., 2011, 
and Alderson and Doran 2011, 2013, Clementi and Schettino, 2015, Clementi et al., 2015, Clementi 
et al., 2016).  This technique assesses the evolution of the middle class and the degree of household 
income polarization in different low, middle and high-income countries.  
This approach has some important advantages as a method for inquiring on polarization 
phenomenon.  It can generate simple graphical displays of results, giving a precise idea on to which 
extent and how income distribution changed in the considered period.  Moreover, this method 
permits the researcher to examine several hypotheses regarding the origins of distributional change. 
Indeed, it provides the possibility of decomposing the overall effect into location and shape 
components. For instance, in the case of a homogeneous absolute addition (subtraction) to all 
incomes, the overall distribution shifts to the left (right) while leaving its shape unaltered.  Thus, the 
MRP (median relative polarization index, see below) equals to zero. In the case in which the mean 
(or median) income is the same in time 1 and time 0, and only the shape of the distribution changes 
(without any location shift), the MRP should be different from zero. In the real world, both location 
and shape effects – named respectively as “growth” and “inequality” (or “distributional”) effect 
(Kakwani, 1993; Bourguignon, 2003, 2004) – concur to produce jointly the distributional change.  
The main novelty of this paper consists in evaluating the occurring distributional transformation in 
China by means of RP tools and comparing the results with the most used inequality/polarization 
measures. Traditional methods for the analysis of such data rely heavily on measures that capture 
only differences in averages between groups or rough measures of dispersion over time. Such 
summary measures leave much of the information inherent in a distribution untapped. Thus, the 
advantage of employing RP method consists in the fact that it allows the researcher to quantify the 
polarization effect due to changes in distributional shape, isolating this effect from the “growth-
location” effect. This analytical benefit is particularly relevant when studying the evolution of 
polarization in a country undergoing very fast economic development, and therefore characterized 
by a very rapid growth of the median income, as has been the case for China.   
10 
 
In order to employ the relative distribution method
13
, it is necessary to single out one of the 
two populations (same variable, in two different years), refer to it as the “comparison” population, 
and refer to the other as the “reference” population.  More formally, let 
0
Y be the income variable for 
the reference population and Y  the income variable for the comparison population.  The relative 
distribution of Y  to 
0
Y is defined as the distribution of the random variable: 
  0 ,R F Y   (1) 
which is obtained from Y  by transforming it by the cumulative distribution function of 
0
Y , 
0
F .  
While this transformation is not widely used or understood in the social sciences, it is a very useful 
one, because R measures the relative rank of Y compared to 
0
Y . It is continuous on the outcome 
space [0, 1], and we will call r, a realization of R, the relative data.  The relative data can be 
interpreted as the set of positions that the income observations of the comparison population would 
have if they were located in the income distribution of the reference population.  The probability 
density function of R , which is called the “relative density,” can be obtained from the ratio of the 
density of the comparison population to the density of the reference population, evaluated at the 
relative data r : 
  
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where  f   and  0f   denote the density functions of Y  and 0Y , respectively, and  
1
0r
y F r

  is 
the quantile function of 
0
Y .  The relative density has a simple interpretation, as it describes where 
households at various quantiles in the comparison distribution are concentrated in terms of the 
quantiles of the reference distribution.  As for any density function, it integrates to 1 over the unit 
interval, and the area under the curve between two values 
1
r  and 
2
r  is the proportion of the 
comparison population whose income values lie between the th
1
r  and th
2
r  quantiles of the reference 
population. 
This method provides intuitive tools that can be used formally to distinguish between growth, 
stability, or decline at specific points of the income distribution(s). In fact, the case in which the 
relative density function shows values equal to 1, it simply represents that the two populations have 
equal density at the thr  quantile of the reference population. A value greater than 1 implies that the 
comparison population has more density than the reference population at the thr  quantile of the 
latter.  Finally, a function value inferior than 1 indicates the comparison population has less density 
in the considered quantile.  
 
Therefore, one of this method’s major advantages consists in the possibility to decompose the 
relative distribution into changes in location and in shape. In other words, it allows to separate the 
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 Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999) provide a more detailed explication and a discussion of its relationship to 
alternative econometric methods for measuring distributional differences. 
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measures usually associated with changes in the median (or mean) of the income distribution by the 
“pure” distributional features change (including differences in variance, asymmetry and/or other 
distributional characteristics) that could be easily linked with several other factors, for instance, 
polarization. Formally, the decomposition can be written as: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0 0 0
Overall relative Density ratio for Density ratio for
density the location effect the shape effect
,
r L r r
r r L r
f y f y f y
g r
f y f y f y
  
1 2 3 14 2 43 14 2 43
  (3) 
 
where    0 0L r rf y f y   is a density function adjusted by an additive shift with the same shape 
as the reference distribution but with the median of the comparison one. The value   is the 
difference between the medians of the comparison and reference distributions. Indeed if the two 
distributions have a different median, the “location effect” is increasing in  if the comparison 
median is higher than the reference one. The opposite happens if the “location effect” is decreasing. 
The “shape effect,” represents the relative density net of the location effect and it isolates 
redistributive movements occurring between the reference and comparison populations.  For 
instance, we could observe a shape effect function with U-shaped pattern if the comparison 
distribution is relatively more spread around the median than the location-adjusted one. Thus, it is 
possible to determine whether there is polarization of the income distribution (increases in both 
tails), “downgrading” (increases in the lower tail), “upgrading” (increases in the upper tail) or 
convergence of incomes towards the median (decreases in both tails). 
The relative distribution approach also includes a median relative polarization index (MRP), 
which is based on changes in the shape of the income distribution to account for polarization.  This 
index is normalized so that it varies between -1 and 1, with 0 representing no change in the income 
distribution relative to the reference year.  Positive values represent more polarization and negative 
values represent less polarization – i.e., convergence towards the center of the distribution.  The 
MRP index for the comparison population can be estimated as (Morris et al., 1994, p. 217): 
 
1
4 1
MRP 1,
2
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i
r
n 
  
 
 
 
   (4) 
where 
i
r  is the proportion of the median-adjusted reference incomes that are less than the hti  income 
from the comparison sample, for 1, ,i n  , and n  is the sample size of the comparison population. 
The MRP index can be additively decomposed into the contributions to overall polarization 
made by the lower and upper halves of the median-adjusted relative distribution, enabling one to 
distinguish downgrading from upgrading.  In terms of data, the lower relative polarization index 
(LRP) and the upper relative polarization index (URP) can be calculated as follows: 
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12 
 
with  
1
MRP LRP URP
2
  .  The MRP, LRP and URP range from -1 to 1, and equal 0 when there 
is no change. 
 
4.2  Main results
14
  
 
In this Subsection we present the principal results of the polarization analysis using CHNS and 
CHIP datasets.  For the CHNS, we estimated the evolution of the variable per capita HH income 
using the price index for 2011.
15
 For CHIP, we used the variable Total household income per 
capita.
16
 Following the methodology proposed by Song et al., (2008), we weighted
17
 the CHIP 
samples by wave, expressing all data in 2012 prices and taking into account regional variability.
18
 
The traditional measures of income polarization---e.g., Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Duclos et al., 
(2004),
19
 ---substantially confirm the last decade’s worsening trend of income distribution (Wang 
and Wan, 2015).  It seems that, similar to the case of inequality indices, the peak has been reached 
in the mid-2000s decade, and in last years a reduction, albeit slight, is detectable.  Urban households 
generally present a higher degree of polarization as compared with the rural ones (Table 2). 
 
Table 1 – Polarization Measures by Wave and Survey 
 
CHNS CHIP 
 
All Urban Rural All Urban Rural 
 
FW DER FW DER FW DER FW DER FW DER FW DER 
1989 0.337 0.228 0.229 0.196 0.406 0.243             
1991 0.335 0.225 0.237 0.194 0.373 0.236             
1993 0.393 0.241 0.322 0.223 0.419 0.247             
1997 0.367 0.234 0.300 0.219 0.404 0.240             
1999             0.401 0.262 0.280 0.214 0.286 0.216 
2000 0.403 0.252 0.335 0.235 0.431 0.243 0.393 0.258 0.283 0.213 0.294 0.220 
2001             0.408 0.264 0.286 0.215 0.294 0.219 
2002             0.451 0.269 0.285 0.214 0.307 0.224 
2004 0.470 0.267 0.429 0.250 0.472 0.236             
2006 0.500 0.284 0.423 0.263 0.513 0.247             
2009 0.463 0.270 0.398 0.256 0.464 0.240             
2011 0.432 0.259 0.351 0.236 0.469 0.269 0.398 0.249 0.305 0.217 0.338 0.234 
2012             0.388 0.249 0.306 0.219 0.332 0.234 
2013             0.383 0.256 0.290 0.222 0.325 0.237 
 
                                                          
14
 For sake of brevity the results of covariates analysis has been include in Appendix 1. 
15
 The selected variable label is hhincpc_cpi, extracted from “Master_Constructed_Income_201410\hhinc_pub_00.dta” 
file. 
16
 The variable was obtained dividing “Total income” (P201) by “Member number within household” (P102), variables 
contained in the file “DS0001[Urban Individual Income, Consumption, and Employment]\21741-0001-Data.dta”. 
Analogous calculations have been conducted to estimate the total income per capita of rural and migrant households. 
17
 The population features data taken from NBS dataset. 
18
 The deflator source is the NBS dataset. 
19
 Both the indices have been calculated using DASP: Distributive Analysis Stata Package, Araar & Duclos, 2009. DER 
index has been calculating with α=0.5. 
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We now go deeper in the polarization analysis, using the Relative distribution tools (Handock and 
Morris, 1998 and 1999) that we have previously presented.  The main advantage, as compared to 
the other measures, consists in the fact that by comparing two different distributions at a time, it is 
possible to extract two different aspects of the polarization process.  The first one can be considered 
as the “growth” effect (the location component).  The second represents the “pure distributional” 
effect (the shape component). As a consequence, following the interpretation given by Clementi and 
Schettino (2015) and Clementi et al., (2015), the application of this methodological tool permits one 
to analyze what is “hidden behind” the overall evolution of structure of the distribution shape that 
was strongly affected by the impressive growth of PRC’s economy. 
  
14 
 
Figure 1 – Relative distribution results - CHNS data 2000-2011 
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Figure 2 – Relative polarization indices by year – CHNS data (2011 as Comparison Distribution) 
 
Figure 3 – Shape effect by year – CHNS Data – (1989 as Reference Distribution) 
 
Figures 1-3 summarize the main results of Relative distribution analysis employed on the CHNS 
dataset.  In Figure 1, the 2011 distribution has been taken as the comparison one; the 2000’s 
distribution as the reference one.  The left-top graph shows the Kernel densities by year, and the 
vertical line indicates the median of each distribution.  The right-top graph describes the relative 
distribution overall effect: a hollowing out of the lowest deciles with a contemporaneous movement 
to the highest ones is clearly detectable.  Separating the overall effect in the location (growth) and 
shape (“pure distribution”) two major points could be discussed.  First, the location effect graph 
(left-bottom) shows that a large part of the overall effect is due to the distributional (median) right-
shift, consequence to the huge GDP growth of the last decade.  Second, excluding this effect, a 
typical polarization profile emerges (shape effect): in fact, the typical hollowing out of the central 
deciles of the distribution is accompanied by “fattening” of both tails (top and bottom deciles, right-
bottom graph) corresponds.  
16 
 
Figure 2 quantifies this tendency taking into account as comparative distribution the 2011’s one, 
and moving from 1989 to 2009, the reference’s distributions.  The polarization trend is also 
confirmed in the period as a whole.  It is important to note that the decreasing trend of MRP-LRP-
URP is due to the fact that the more the reference year is close to the comparison one, the lower is 
the polarization degree.
20
 Overall,for each reference year the analysis confirmsthe fact that the MRP 
is principally driven by the LRP.  In other words, in the considered period the Chinese middle class 
has moved mainly to the lowest deciles of the distribution. However, this “pure distributional” effect 
has been largely mitigated by the impressive GDP growth.  Figure 3 presents the Shape effect 
change in the period, as a whole.  In Figure 5, 1989’s distribution has been taken as the reference 
one while the comparison ones move from 1991 to 2011.  From another point of view, it shows the 
hollowing out movement of the middle class; at the same time, a significant tendency towards 
polarization on the top and bottom deciles of the distribution is here confirmed. 
The same exercise was performed on CHIP data, for the waves (2002-2013). As expected, the 
results are quite similar, and substantially confirm the trends revealed by the analysis of CHNS data 
(Figure 4).  Summarizing, we can say that the crucial role of the impressive GDP growth of last 
decade (left-bottom graph – location effect) hides the significant “pure” distributive change (right-
bottom graph – shape effect) that has gone in the direction of an increasing polarization, driven 
principally from the bottom deciles of the distribution (MRP=0.744; LRP=0.831; URP=0.656). 
Thus, analyzing the results as a whole, we can affirm that many households who used to belong to 
the middle income classes experienced no or relatively modest income increases. Therefore, their 
relative position worsened, and they moved from the central to the lowest decile of the distribution. 
This overall distributional outcome has been the product of many complex, overlapping and 
mutually interrelated factors. Among the most relevant the following are probably the most 
noteworthy. Changes in labor markets led to a widening of income differentials and to the 
emergence of new categories of urban workers, such as the self-employed and those hired by 
private firms (the relative positions of which worsened with respect to SOE and public employees) 
and migrants (who were penalized by their lack of hukou registration status, but improved their lot 
with respect to many other rural residents). Many private entrepreneurs became rich, some of them 
very rich. The fast but uneven expansion of access to basic amenities (i.e., water plant and flush-in 
house facilities) and to not-so-basic, human capital-enhancing services such as higher education 
also played a role
21
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 Relevant distributional changes occur normally in a medium/long period. 
21
 See Appendix. 
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Figure 4 – Relative distribution results - CHIP data 2002-2013 
 
 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Since China launched a series of progressively deeper market-oriented reforms from 1978-9 
onwards, growth has accelerated but inequality has also increased.  The new and unique Chinese 
socioeconomic system is still in transition but relatively stable. It can be argued that China’s 
catching up process since the inception of the reform period has outpaced those of Japan and South 
Korea earlier, setting a new world record.   
 
A historical comparison shows that the rapid decline in inequality that occurred in post-
revolutionary China during its first phase of development has been reversed during the market-
oriented reforms period.  Crucially, this has also led to rapid polarization in the 21
st
 century in 
particular. While the topic of general “inequality” in China has been studied relatively intensely, 
less attention has been paid to the polarization phenomenon.  Polarization, as opposed to inequality, 
has the characteristic of showing scientifically distinct distributional problems as features related to 
the formation, consolidation or the hollowing out of the middle class.  
 
We studied the polarization features applying the Relative Distribution method (Handcock and 
Morris, 1998, 1999) on two distinct dataset containing household budget surveys (CHNS and 
CHIP) from decade 80s to the last available round (2014). The overall effect over time has been a 
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movements of the majority of the population towards higher levels of income (those that only  
belonged to the highest deciles at the beginning of the period). 
 
The most important feature of the method we employ consists in the possibility of separating the 
overall effect in the location (growth) and shape (“pure distribution”) of the statistical distributions. 
Following this methodological step, we obtain some new results that provide a novel interpretation 
of the Chinese distributional inequalities in terms of the relative polarization indexes. The location 
effect shows that a large part of the overall effect is due to the distribution’s (median) right-shift, a 
clear consequence of the huge GDP growth of last decade(s). When excluding this growth-location 
effect, a typical polarization profile emerges. This is nothing other than the so-called shape effect. 
More specifically, the typical hollowing out of the central deciles of the distribution in PRC has 
been indeed accompanied by “fattening” of both tails of income distribution.  
 
These results seem to be in opposition to the widely shared received idea that in the last decades the 
Chinese middle class consolidated its status, increasing both in terms of per capita income and in 
number. In fact, if we look merely at the “pure distributional” effect, our analysis tells that during 
the reform period, the Chinese middle class has moved mainly to the lower deciles of the 
distribution. However, this apparent contradiction can be statistically and economically solved by 
adding the other component of the overall effect, i.e. the location one. 
 
Thus, the method we employed enabled us to examine critically the idea that the impressive GDP 
growth of last decade created  a growing the Chinese middle class that will continue to grow. Our 
results show that scientifically there is no firm ground for basing such optimism regarding the 
growth of a middle class in PRC since many members of this class are being  driven now to the 
bottom deciles of the distribution. As a consequence, as growth slows, unless countervailing 
policies are undertaken, polarization will reveal itself more sharply, and might eventually lead to 
increasing distributional and related political conflicts in PRC.
22
 
23
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 These results are consistent with the analysis of results of Khan(2017) and Khan(2010) that use different 
methodologies. 
23
 The risk of increasing social unrest has been clearly identified by PRC leaders and many other observers. According 
to Prof. Deng Chundong, dean of the Academy of Marxism of the CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), “since 
reforms and opening up, the gap between rich and poor, regions and industries has been expanding. China is in a crucial 
period of reform, but also in a period of highlighted contradictions….there is a high incidence of social contradictions, 
which are often acute, and even occur as group incidents. How to realize social stability and promote social harmony 
will be big problem for a long time in the future.”(Deng Chundong, 2017 pp. 72-73). 
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Appendix 1 – Covariates analysis 
 
The main aim of this Subsection consists in pointing out the principle covariates considered as 
drivers of the (relative) polarization, in the sense of Handcock and Morris (1998, 1999).  Wan and 
Wang (2015) deeply inquire on the polarization changes by decomposing income sources.  
Differently, and to some extent, in order to provide a more exhaustive analysis, we decompose the 
detected polarization by household features, applying the covariate adjustment technique 
(Handcock and Morris, 1998, 1999) as modified by Clementi and Schettino (2015). 
Since the covariates selection, according to the literature, is commonly linked to households’ assets 
and/or household-head characteristics, we employ this methodology on CHNS data that, as sketched 
out in previous sections, is richer than CHIP in terms of information we need.  The selected 
variables for our analysis are connected to household location (Area and Stratum); HH head’s age, 
its gender, HH head’s education, its occupational status and the sector of employment are evaluated 
as proxies for socio-demographic features.  Moreover, two variables (Source of drinking water and 
Typology of Toilette in the dwelling), representative of HH’s assets, have been taken in 
consideration.  In Table 2, descriptive statistics are reported.  
 
Table A1 – Descriptive statistics by covariate 
    Mean Income  Population Share Gini 
  
2000 2011 2000 2011 2000 2011 
Age              
 
less than 40               5,493           17,546  24.71 10.54 0.45 0.45 
 
41-60               5,824           16,858  51.19 52.10 0.43 0.46 
 
61-80               5,305           14,328  22.55 34.19 0.50 0.45 
 
more than 80               4,337           16,272  1.56 3.17 0.49 0.47 
Area               
 
Urban               7,393           19,177  32.96 42.89 0.43 0.42 
 
Rural               4,721           13,695  67.04 57.11 0.45 0.47 
Stratum               
 
Urban Neighborhood               7,995           21,022  15.70 27.63 0.40 0.38 
 
Suburban Village               6,846           15,836  17.26 15.26 0.45 0.49 
 
County Town Neighborhood               5,875           16,461  16.35 17.66 0.42 0.45 
 
Rural Village               4,349           12,457  50.69 39.44 0.45 0.48 
Nationality             
 
Han               5,772           16,302  87.43 90.78 0.45 0.46 
 
not Han               4,420           13,532  12.57 9.22 0.45 0.46 
Gender               
 
Male               5,481           15,926  86.16 79.41 0.45 0.46 
 
Female               6,352           16,513  13.84 20.59 0.46 0.45 
Level of Education             
 
Less than technical degree               5,161           13,762  88.94 80.60 0.45 0.46 
 
At least Technical Degree               9,144           25,539  11.06 19.40 0.40 0.36 
Presently Working             
 
No               5,511           14,308  26.24 41.10 0.48 0.45 
 
Yes               5,634           17,260  73.76 58.90 0.44 0.46 
Type of Work Unit             
 
Public               8,357           24,676  21.90 14.86 0.37 0.37 
 
Private               4,829           14,541  78.10 85.14 0.46 0.46 
Major Source of Drinking Water             
 
ground water               4,632           12,876  38.45 27.37 0.45 0.48 
 
open well               3,953           15,865  6.45 1.61 0.51 0.59 
 
creek, spring, river, lake               4,571           11,140  5.27 4.58 0.43 0.49 
 
ice/snow             11,171           13,225  0.08 0.04 0.62 0.25 
 
water plant               6,717           17,718  48.23 65.70 0.43 0.43 
 
Other               3,679           15,032  0.73 0.18 0.38 0.48 
 
Unknown               6,313           16,112  0.80 0.50 0.49 0.36 
Toilette in the HH             
 
Flush, in-house               7,518           17,997  34.19 64.23 0.41 0.43 
 Other               4,607           12,545  65.81 35.77 0.45 0.48 
Source: Our elaboration on CHNS data (2000 and 2011) 
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Consistently with Clementi and Schettino (2015) methodology, in order to overwhelm the strong 
growth effect, the overall shape effect is decomposed for covariates.  That way, new evidences have 
to be analyzed from two distinct points of view: the first showing the change in composition effect 
on the detected relative polarization, while the second, figures out the residual effect of the whole 
change. 
 
Figure A1 – Composition effect by covariate (2000-2011) 
21 
 
 
Summarizing the effect by macro-categories, we can affirm that the labor market variables “pure” 
composition change increased the polarization through the bottom deciles of the distribution.  In 
other words, both the unemployment growth and the increasing share of private worker (or self-
employees) that, on average, gain lower wage (see Table 2), in last decade acted like an important 
driver for lower polarization.  On the other side, the upper polarization has been driven by a large 
number of variables.  As yet detected, from other points of view, by Wan and Wang (2015), the 
rapid urbanization improved the general status of migrating families: both “area” and “stratum” 
confirm the hollowing out of the lowest deciles and the contemporaneous increase of the highest 
ones’ fatness.  The same results figure out by asset variables.  The rapid diffusion of Water Plant 
and “Flush-in house” clearly coincides with the general increase in terms of well-being, especially 
for the families that improved the dwelling features.  Finally, the change in composition of HH’s 
head education acted principally on the upper polarization, underlying, once more, the importance 
of its returns. 
 
22 
 
Figure A2 – Residual effect by covariate (CHNS 2000-2011) 24 
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 The principle results in terms of relative polarization indices by covariate are not reported. Anyway, they are reliable 
upon request. 
